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Pregnancy-Based Discrimination-
GeneralElectric Co. v. Gilbert1 and
Alternative State Remedies
I. Introduction
Childbearing biologically falls upon females. Historically, this fact
has often been relied upon in stifling women's equality in the labor force.
2
Yet pregnancy, if treated like any other disabling condition, need not pose
a serious obstacle to any woman's career. On December 7, 1976, however,
the Supreme Court condoned some employers' utilization of pregnancy to
thwart women's quest for economic stability. In General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert3 the Court announced that pregnancy may be excluded from an
otherwise comprehensive employee disability insurance program4 pro-
vided by an employer. The court decided that an employer's election to
exclude pregnancy from covered disabilities is not sex discrimination
within the prohibitions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 In a
broader sense, however, Gilbert may be interpreted by many as pronounc-
ing that disparate treatment based on pregnancy does not constitute sex
discrimination for any purpose.
6
In view of its possible far-reaching implications, Gilbert must be
carefully examined to define its breadth and limitations. Since Title VII
may now have been severely limited as a means for attacking pregnancy-
related discrimination, other avenues of redress must be explored. Before
these tasks are undertaken, Gilbert must be placed in historical perspective
1. 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976), rev'g, 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975).
2. Id. at 419 (dissenting opinion), citing U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CONSUMER INCOME
(Series P-60, No. 94, July 1974); WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, UNDERUTILIZA-
TION OF WOMEN WORKERS (rev. ed. 1971). See also Ginsburg & Roth, Pregnancy and
Discrimination, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1977, at 35, Col. 2.
3. 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976).
4. GE's plan pays employees 60% of weekly earnings when the employee becomes
disabled as a result of non-occupational sickness or accident, including, for example,
attempted suicide, drug addiction, elective surgery, and sports injuries. Gilbert v. General
Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367, 371,374(E.D. Va. 1974), affd, 519 F.2d661 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd,
97 S. Ct. 401 (1976). For a detailed description of GE's plan, see 97 S. Ct. at 404; 375 F. Supp.
at 371.
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1971) (amended Supp. 11 1973). Subparagraph
2000e-2(a), the portion of the statute pertinent to this discussion, specifies:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer. . . to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national
origin.
6. But see notes 135-44 and accompanying text infra.
by reviewing the Supreme Court's prior treatment of pregnancy discrimi-
nation charges and by considering lower courts' handling of the disability
exclusion issue.
II. Historical Perspective
A. Prior Supreme Court Treatment of the Pregnancy Discrimination
Issue
Prior to Gilbert the Supreme Court had decided two significant
pregnancy discrimination cases: Cleveland Board of Education v. La-
Fleur7 and Geduldig v. Aiello.
8
1. Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur.-In LaFleur the
Court struck down school board policies mandating leaves of absence for
pregnant teachers during the fourth and fifth months of pregnancy and
prohibiting their return to work until the semester following their children's
reaching three months of age. 9 Policies requiring medical certification of
physical fitness prior to reemployment after pregnancy leave were up-
held.' 0 While the outcome of LaFleur was encouraging to those who
wished to see women's burden of childbearing eased, the Court's approach
to the problem and the limited scope of its holding were less encouraging.
Although the district and circuit courts in LaFleur had based their
conclusions on the equal protection clause, "1 the Supreme Court turned to
the due process clause.' 2 Deep significance lies in the Court's refusal to
acknowledge that pregnancy-based classifications constitute sex discrimi-
nation. Although in his concurring opinion Justice Powell advocated an
equal protection analysis,' 3 his position offered little hope to women
seeking protection from restrictive pregnancy policies. Rather than deny
the school boards' right to classify on the basis of pregnancy, he concluded
that the classification chosen by the boards, i.e., teachers who were four or
five months pregnant or teachers who had infants less than three months
7. 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (with companion case Cohen v. Chesterfield Sch. Dist.). For a
thorough discussion of LaFleur, see Comment, Due Process and the Pregnant Worker: The
New Weapon in the Equal Rights Arsenal, 23 EMORY L.J. 787 (1974); 50 WASH. L. REV. 481
(1975).
8. 417 U..S. 484 (1974). For a thorough discussion of Geduldig, see Comment,
Geduldig v. Aiello: Pregnancy Classifications and Definition of Sex Discrimination, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 441 (1975); Note, Pregnancy and Sex-Based Discrimination in Employment:
A Post-Aiello Analysis, 44 CINN. L. REV. 57 (1975).
9. 414 U.S. at 648, 650.
10. Id. at 650.
It. Id. at 636. The district court found no violation of the equal protection clause. 326
F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ohio 1971). The circuit court disagreed. 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972).
12. The Court reasoned that the due process clause protected freedom of choice in
family life and marriage and that since "restrictive maternity leave regulations can constitute
a heavy burden on the exercise of these protected freedoms" the due process clause
"requires that such rules must not needlessly, arbitrarily, or capriciously impinge upon this
vital area of a teacher's constitutional liberty." 414 U.S. at 640. The Court rejected the
purported justifications for the restrictive policies. Id. at 5.40-50.
13. Id. at 651 (concurring opinion). He adopted this position since "not every govern-
ment policy that burdens childbearing violates the constitution." Id. He felt that these
restrictive leave policies were not an invalid infringement of the right to procreate. Id. at 652.
old, were irrational. " Powell specifically declined to decide "whether
these regulations involve sex classifications at all" and suggested that they
might be disability classifications.' 5
LaFleur is significant not only for the Court's refusal to adopt an
equal protection analysis, but also for its implicit recognition that pregnan-
cy can be treated differently than other disabilities. 6 Although it would
seem reasonable to compare pregnancy leave rules to temporary disability
leave rules, no direct comparison was made, and there is no indication that
the Court even considered the possibility that a distinction should not be
drawn. By not treating pregnancy as a temporary disability, the Court
implied that it is sui generis. This conclusion was reached more explicitly
in Geduldig v. Aiello. 17
2. Geduldig v. Aiello. -The suspicion aroused by LaFleur that the
Court would treat pregnancy unfavorably was soon confirmed. Faced with
an equal protection challenge to a California statute that provided disability
insurance for all workers within the state but excluded pregnancy from
coverage, the Court concluded that the state's interests'" justified the
exclusion.' 9 Refusing to find that a sex-based classification had resulted,
the Court said instead that the classification was based upon disability. This
was articulated in the infamous and often-quoted "footnote 20":
[Tihis case is thus a far cry from cases. . . involving discrimina-
tion based upon gender as such. The California insurance pro-
gram does not exclude anyone from benefit eligibility because of
gender but merely removes one physical condition-
pregnancy-from the list of compensable disabilities. While it is
true that only women can become pregnant, it does not follow
that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a
sex-based classification . . . . Normal pregnancy is an objec-
tively identifiable physical condition with unique charac-
teristics.2 0
This language was frightening to those seeking protection for pregnant
workers because, arguably, it could be interpreted to mean that allegations
of sex discrimination cannot be predicated upon pregnancy classifications
-an interpretation that was subsequently urged upon the courts by
employers.
14. -[T]he classifications chosen by these boards ... are either counter-productive or
irrationally overinclusive. ... Id. at 653 (concurring opinion).
15. Id.at 653 n.2. This may have been the first foreshadowing of the approach the Court
was to take in both Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), and General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert,
97 S. Ct. 401 (1976).
16. Id. at 642 n. 10, 655 n. 3 (concurring opinion). These footnotes indicate the Court's
feeling that abnormal pregnancies could be handled like other disabilities, thereby implying
that normal pregnancies need not be.
17. "Normal pregnancy is an objectively identifiable physical condition with unique
characteristics." 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20.
18. "The State has a legitimate interest in maintaining the self-supporting nature of
[the] insurance program, . . . distributing the available resources in such a way as to keep
benefit payments at an adequate level,. .. [and] maintaining the contribution rate at a level
that will not unduly burden participating employees .... ' Id. at 496.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 496-97 n.20.
B. The Effect of Geduldig on Title VII Cases
The Court's approach in Geduldig to a state-sponsored disability plan
became a formidable obstacle to Title VII attacks on employer-sponsored
plans because of their essential similarity. In each of the three circuits in
which the validity of pregnancy exclusions was considered in light of Title
VII, 2' the precedent of Geduldig was asserted by the employer. Neverthe-
less, each court rejected this argument and held that the disability plan
violated the antidiscrimination provisions of Title VII. 22 In so holding each
court found that plaintiffs had satisfied their burden of establishing a prima
facie case of discrimination by proving that a neutral classification had
discriminatory effects 23-plaintiffs had shown that denial of pregnancy
coverage singled out women since only a disability borne exclusively by
women was treated adversely.
Whether a Title VII plaintiff can establish a prima facie case is crucial
to the outcome since to do so shifts the burden to the employer to justify its
policy by demonstrating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory business justifica-
tion.24 That is, the employer must prove "that the suspect conduct is
necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business."25 Whether
the court finds that a prima facie case has been established depends on the
manner in which the court perceives the nature of pregnancy. Three
approaches are evident in the cases.
First, a court may treat pregnancy as neither a disability nor a sickness
and conclude that pregnancy entitles employees to neither disability nor
sickness benefits. Courts taking this position reason that if a plan entitles
female employees to receive benefits for sickness and disabilities other
than pregnancy it does not violate Title VII.2 6 Second, pregnancy may be
treated as a "disability sui generis," with the conclusion that since men
and women are not similarly situated regarding pregnancy, disparate
treatment is not discriminatory.27 Third, pregnancy may be treated as a
21. Gilbert v. General Elec. Co.,519F.2d 661(4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976);
Communications Workers of America v. AT&T Co., 513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1975), vacated
and remanded, 97 S. Ct. 724 (1977); Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir.
1975), vacated on jurisd. grounds, 424 U.S. 737 (1976). Additionally, two circuits have held
that failure to permit coverage of pregnancy under sick leave programs violated Title VII.
Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 522 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 806 (1977);
Hutchinson v. Lake Oswego School Dist., 519 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct.
731 (1977).
22. Id.
23. Id. See General Elec. Co., v. Gilbert, 97 S. Ct. 401, 408 (1976).
24. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Wetzel v. Liberty
Mutual Ins. Co., 372 F. Supp. 1146,1152 (W.D. Pa. 1974), 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated
onjurisd. grounds, 424 U.S. 737 (1976); see Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367,
381, 382 (E.D. Va. 1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976).
25. Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367,382(E.D. Va. 1974), aff'd, 519F.2d
661 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976).
26. Newman v. Delta Airlines, 374 F. Supp. 238, 245-46 (N.D. Ga.), aff'd, 475 F.2d 768
(5th Cir. 1973).
27. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974); see Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 642 n.10, 647 n.13 (1974). See notes 16-17 and accompanying text
supra.
disability and recognized as a basis of sex discrimination. 28 Only if the last
of these approaches is adopted may employees hope for a favorable
verdict.
C. Gilbert in the Lower Courts
Both the court of appeals and the district court in Gilbert29 adopted
this last approach in ruling that General Electric's (GE's) disability plan
constituted sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. To support its
adoption of the position that pregnancy may be the basis of sex discrimina-
tion, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that "terms or conditions of employ-
ment" as those words are used in Title VII3 include disability insurance
programs, and that sex-based limitations on such programs are therefore
prohibited.31 The court found the limitation on pregnancy coverage to be
sex-based because
[a] disability program which, while granting disability benefits
generally, denies such benefits expressly for disability arising
out of pregnancy, a disability possible only among women, is
manifestly one which can result in a less comprehensive program
of employee compensation and benefits for women employees
than for men employees; and would do so on the basis of sex.
'[W]omen, to be treated without discrimination [under the Act],
must be permitted to be women,' and this means a right to be'women' without being burdened by any discrimination in em-
ployment benefits, whether in wages or in fringe benefits, on
account of characteristics peculiar to their sex.12
The court gave "great deference" to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) Guideline on Sex Discrimination, 33 which clearly
establishes that disparate treatment of pregnancy can be the basis of sex
discrimination. 34
28. Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661(4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976);
Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated on jurisd. grounds,
424 U.S. 737 (1976).
29. 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975), aff'g, 375 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Va. 1974).
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) (1971), quoted at note 5 supra.
31. 519 F.2d at 663-64.
32. Id. at 664 (footnotes omitted).
33. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.10 (1975), which specifies:
(a) A written or unwritten employment policy or practice which excludes
from employment applicants or employees because of pregnancy is a prima facie
violation of Title VII.
(b) Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, miscarriage, abor-
tion, childbirth, and recovery therefrom are, for all job-related purposes, tempor-
ary disabilities and should be treated as such under any health or temporary
disability insurance or sick leave plan available in connection with employment.
Written and unwritten employment policies and practices involving matters such as
the commencement and duration of leave, the availability of extensions, the
accrual of seniority and other benefits and privileges, reinstatements, and payment
under any health or temporary disability insurance or sick leave plan, formal or
informal, shall be applied to disability due to pregnancy or childbirth on the same
terms and conditions as they are applied to other temporary disabilities.
(c) Where the termination of an employee who is temporarily disabled is
caused by an employment policy under which insufficient or no leave is available,
such a termination violates the Act if it has a disparate impact on employees of one
sex and is not justified by business necessity.
34. 519 F.2d at664.
By adopting the third position, the court recognized that plaintiffs had
presented a prima facie case and that GE was therefore required to offer an
affirmative defense. Rather than defend by demonstrating a business
justification, 5 however, GE maintained that the policy did not represent
sex discrimination and attempted to persuade the court to adopt the first or
second position.36 None of GE's arguments was acceptable to the court.
The company argued that its plan offered benefits only during
sickness and that pregnancy is not a sickness because it is voluntary.37 The
court rejected this argument, observing that "illness" was not defined in
the disability insurance policy and that GE's coverage of other "volun-
tary" disabilities revealed that the disability definition was not linked to
"voluntarism": "[D]efendant raises this defense of 'voluntarism' only
against a disability that is unique to women and disregards it in connection
with any claim for disability submitted by male employees."
38
The Fourth Circuit also rejected GE's argument that Geduldig v.
Aiello 39 was controlling. GE urged that Geduldig "authoritatively deter-
mined that . . . disparity in treatment between pregnancy-related and
other disabilities cannot be classified as sex discrimination .... 40 GE
based its interpretation of Geduldig primarily on footnote 20 of that case, 4'
contending that it meant pregnancy could never be the basis of sex
discrimination in employment. The court of appeals completely rejected
this interpretation, noting that the Geduldig claim arose only under the
equal protection clause and that the Supreme Court, rather than finding the
program nondiscriminatory, had held that the discrimination was not
"invidious," as required for a finding of equal protection infringement.
42
The circuit court emphasized that Title VII, by contrast, prohibits all
discrimination.43
III. General Electric Co. v. Gilbert' Before the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court rejected the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit and
accepted instead virtually every argument GE had urged upon the court of
appeals. 45 The Court adopted the view that pregnancy is a disability sui
35. See id. at 665-66.
36. Id. at 665.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
40. 519 F.2d at 665.
41. Id. at 666-67. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976).
45. The circuit court's reasoning can be summarized as follows: (I) disability insurance
is a term or condition of employment and is therefore covered by Title VII; (2) sex-based
limitations on such plans would violate Title VII; (3) pregnancy exclusions are sex-based;
therefore, (4) GE's plan violated Title VII. See notes 30-32 and accompanying text; upra. The
Supreme Court agreed with points (1). and (2), but disagreed with (3), reaching a different
conclusion. 97 S. Ct. at 406, 408, 409.
Further, the circuit court rejected the arguments that pregnancy is not a disability
because it is voluntary, see notes 37-38 and accompanying text ; upra, and that Gel uldig was
generis, 4 6 a position that predetermined the outcome of the case since it
compelled a finding that plaintiffs had failed to sustain their burden of
proving a prima facie case of discrimination. 47 The basis of this position
was the precedent established by Geduldig:4 8 a pregnancy-related exclu-
sion is not sex-related. This premise, which the Court accepted as a
"given," was actually part of the very issue to be determined. Employers'
persistence in asserting the applicability of Geduldig to Title VII cases had
paid off.
Geduldig was the "starting point" 49 of the Court's analysis in
Gilbert. The majority reasoned that fourteenth amendment cases can be
used to define "discrimination" in Title VII cases, 50 and that Geduldig
was therefore relevant. Three avenues existed by which plaintiffs could
have established discrimination: by demonstrating that the disability plan
was invidiously discriminatory per se; 5' by showing that it was a "pretext
designed to effect invidious discrimination" ;52 or by proving that even
though the employer had no discriminatory intent the plan had a dis-
criminatory effect.53 Because of its reliance on Geduldig, the Court
concluded that plaintiffs had not successfully utilized any of the three
avenues: the Court's refusal to see pregnancy disability exclusions as being
gender-based precluded any finding of discrimination. Although the Court
did not segregate its opinion into clearly defined discussions of these
methods of establishing discrimination, and although the Court frequently
reapplied the same argument in refuting plaintiffs' claims on each of these
grounds, these three avenues provide a structure for discussing the Gilbert
decision.
A final point in the Court's analysis will also be considered. The Court
held that the EEOC guideline, 54 which specifically prohibited pregnancy
exclusion in disability benefits plans, was entitled to little weight because it
conflicted with other federal regulations and was inconsistent with earlier
EEOC policy. 
5
relevant, see notes 40-41 and accompanying text supra. The Supreme Court also disagreed
with these holdings. See notes 49-50, 57-58, 61, 83-85, 88-90 and accompanying text infra.
The Supreme Court made special note of the fact that "the court of appeals was...
wrong in concluding that . . .Geduldig was not applicable .... "and that it misinterpreted
Geduldig to hold that the plan at issue in that case discriminated but not invidiously. 97 S. Ct.
at 408.
46. [W]e have here no question of excluding a disease or disability comparable in
all other respects to covered diseases or disabilities and yet confined to the
members of one race or sex. Pregnancy is of course confined to women, but it is in
other ways significantly different from the typical covered disease or disability.
Id. "[I]t is not a 'disease' at all, and is often a voluntarily undertaken and desired condi-
tion... " Id. "Normal pregnancy is an objectively identifiable physical condition with
unique characteristics." Id. at 407, quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 n.20
(1974).
47. Id. at 409.
48. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
49. 97 S. Ct. at 407.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 407-08.
53. Id. at 408.
54. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1975), quoted at note 33 supra.
55. 97 S. Ct. at 411.
A. The Issues of Gilbert: Point-Counterpoint
Virtually every argument presented by the majority in support of the
positions summarized above was questioned in either Justice Brennan's or
Justice Stevens' dissent. These challenges were not rebutted in the majority
opinion, in which Justice Rehnquist made only one brief remark regarding
the strong arguments presented by the dissenters. 56 The Court's reasoning
will be discussed in light of the dissenters' challenges.
1. The Relevancy of Geduldig.-The Court began by noting that
Congress had not defined "discrimination" in Title VII. 57 While conced-
ing that this did not necessarily imply that Congress "intended to incorpo-
rate into Title VII the concepts of discrimination which have evolved from
court decisions construing the Equal Protection Clause," the majority did
express its belief that "those decisions . . . are a useful starting point in
interpreting" Title VII.58 Interestingly, no precedent was cited for this
conclusion. Justice Brennan countered in his dissent by referring to "a long
line" of cases demonstrating "that the Fourteenth Amendment standard of
discrimination is [not] coterminous with that applicable to Title VII ' 59
Justice Stevens likewise disputed the applicability of equal protection cases
to Title VII claims, "[s]ince the plaintiff's burden of proving a prima facie
violation of that constitutional provision is significantly heavier than the
burden of proving a prima facie violation of a statutory prohibition against
discrimination .... "60 Despite these criticisms the Court declared that
Geduldig was "quite relevant" in determining whether the pregnancy
exclusion discriminated on the basis of sex. 61 With the exception of the
discussion discrediting the EEOC guideline, 61 the remainder of the opinion
is essentially a reaffirmation of Geduldig and quotes extensively from that
case.
2. The Invidious Discrimination Argument.-Having concluded
that Geduldig applied, the Court had only to quote from that case to
illustrate that the GE disability benefit plan was facially neutral and did not
invidiously discriminate. As in Geduldig, the Court found an absence of
56. Id. at 408.
57. Id. at 407.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 417 n.6 (dissenting opinion). The majority's insistence that Congress, in
passing Title VII, intended to prohibit discrimination only as that term had been defined under
the fourteenth amendment is an "ominous signal" for women's rights advocates. Women
have not been afforded much protection from sex discrimination under this amendment.
"[U]ntil 1971, the Supreme Court consistently interpreted the 14th Amendment to allow
wholly arbitrary forms of sex discrimination ... " Ginsburg & Roth, Pregnancy and
Discrimination, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1977, at 35, Col. 2, 4. The many fourteenth amendment
decisions that allowed sex-based classification will now be cited as precedent for denying
relief under Title VII. One difficulty with the Court's reasoning is that it renders Title VII
meaningless, affording no more protection than was already available under the fourteenth
amendment.
60. Id. at 420 (dissenting opinion).
61. Id. at 407.
62. See notes 113-21 and accompanying text infra.
invidious discrimination predicated upon the asserted "lack of identity
between the excluded disability and gender," which was illustrated by
division of "potential recipients into two groups-pregnant women and
nonpregnant persons." 63 "While the first group is exclusively female,"
the Court reasoned, "the second includes members of both sexes." 64 The
majority deduced that the classification was not gender-based 65 but rather
was disability-based, that the plan did not exclude anyone because of
gender but merely removed one disabling condition, 66 and that the chal-
lenge to the plan was actually to its underinclusiveness.
67
Justice Stevens disagreed with this analysis, labelling the plan dis-
criminatory "by definition" because "it is the capacity to become pre-
gnant which primarily differentiates the female from the male." 68 He
further accentuated the sex-related basis of the classification by emphasiz-
ing that "[t]he classification is between persons who face a risk of
pregnancy and those who do not." 69 Most female employees would be
included in the unprotected risk group since nearly all women of working
age are also of childbearing age.
70
Justice Brennan's remark was even more to the point. "Surely it
offends common sense to suggest . . . that a classification revolving
around pregnancy is not, at the minimum, strongly 'sex related.' ",71
Attacking the Court's underinclusiveness analysis as shallow,7 2 "simplis-
tic and misleading," 7 3 he added that "no one seriously contends that
General Electric or other companies actually conceptualized or developed
their comprehensive insurance programs disability-by-disability in a strict-
63. 97 S. Ct. at 407.
64. Id.
65. "[A]n exclusion of pregnancy from a disability benefits plan providing general
coverage is not a gender-based discrimination at all." Id. at 408.
66. "The ... insurance program does not exclude anyone from eligibility because of
gender but merely removes one physical condition-pregnancy-from the list of compens-
able disabilities." Id. at 407, quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 n.20 (1974).
67. "The classification in this case relates to the asserted underinclusiveness of the set
of risks . I..." Id., quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494 (1974).
68. Id. at 421 (dissenting opinion).
69. Id. at 421 n.5 (dissenting opinion).
70. The "prime working years" are 25 to 54, and women "are least likely to be in the
labor force if they are under 18 or over 54 years of age." U.S. EMPL. STANDARDS
ADMINISTRATION, WOMEN'S BUREAU, DEP'TOF LABOR, WOMEN WORKERS TODAY 2 (1976). In
1974 the median age for female workers was 36. U.S. EMPL. STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION,
WOMEN'S BUREAU, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 297, 1975 HANDBOOK ON WOMEN WORKERS
15 (1975). While the most fertile childbearing ages are 25 to 34, id. at 12, it is generally
accepted that conception is possible for most women between 18 and 50 at least.
71. 97 S. Ct. at 414 (dissenting opinion).
72. Id. at 416 n.5 (dissenting opinion). Footnote 5 states:
Indeed, the shallowness of the Court's "underinclusive" analysis is transpar-
ent. Had General Electric assembled a catalogue of all ailments that befall humani-
ty, and then systematically proceeded to exclude from coverage every disability
that is female-specific or predominantly inflicts women, the Court could still reason
as here that the plan operates equally: Women, like men, would be entitled to draw
disability payments for their circumcisions and postatectomies, and neither sex
could claim payment for pregnancies, breast cancer, and the other excluded
female-dominated disabilities. Along similar lines, any disability that occurs dis-
proportionately in a particular group-sickle-cell anemia, for example-could be
freely excluded from the plan without troubling the Court's analytical approach.
73. Id. at 416 (dissenting opinion).
ly sex-neutral fashion." 7 4 For purposes of argument Brennan was willing
to assume that if Geduldig controlled, the plan was not invidiously
discriminatory per se. 75 He then reminded the majority that Geduldig
requires a determination of whether the plan was factually the result of a
neutral policy or "stemmed from a policy that purposefully downgraded
women's role in the labor force." 76 Justice Brennan, citing the very case
the majority was so heavily relying on, thus challenged his brethren to deny
that GE's plan was a pretext for discrimination. The response did not
satisfy him.
3. The Pretextual Discrimination Question.-In a manner similar
to its treatment of the indivious discrimination issue, the Court reasoned
that GE's plan was not a pretext to effect discrimination. There was "no
evidence . . . that the selection of risks insured. . . worked to discrimi-
nate against any definable group. . . . "' The Court based its reasoning
on two grounds. The first was a risk analysis: because "[tihere is no risk
from which men are protected and women are not . . . [and] there is no
risk from which women are protected and men are not, ' 78 there was no
discrimination for which the plan could be a pretext. The second was a
uniqueness analysis: the excluded disability was not like covered
disabilities.
(a) Risk analysis.-The Court's first basis for denying pretextual dis-
crimination, the risk analysis, utilizes a severely restricted treatment of the
concept of risk. As Justice Stevens' dissent points out, "Insurance prog-
rams, company policies, and employment contracts all deal with future
risks rather than historic facts. 7 9 Male employees are covered for every
possible event that might disrupt their family's income; female employees
are not. Men and women are covered for all "mutually contractible" risks,
and men are covered for all risks specific to males, but women are not
covered for all risks specific to females. 80 Justice Stevens recognized that,
[i]f the word 'risk' is used narrowly, men are protected against
the risks associated with a prostate operation whereas women
are not. If the word is used more broadly to describe the risk of
uncompensated unemployment caused by physical disability
men receive total protection . . . against that risk whereas
women receive only paritial protection.8
74. Id. at 420 (dissenting opinion).
75. "Considered most favorably to the Court's view, Geduldig established the proposi-
tion that a pregnancy classification standing alone cannot be said to fall into the category of
classifications that rest explicitly on 'gender as such'...." Id. at 414 (dissenting opinion,
citation omitted). But Brennan noted the district court finding that the exclusion was not
neutral on its face. Id. at 415.
76. Id. at 414-15 (dissenting opinion).
77. Id. at 408, quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 421 n.5 (dissenting opinion). See notes 63-64 and accompanying text supra
(relating the risk analysis to the classification involved).
80. Id. at 416 (dissenting opinion).
81. Id. at 421 n.5 (dissenting opinion).
If the protection afforded by nature, i.e. the physical inability to suffer
particular disabilities, and the protection afforded by insurance are taken
together, men are fully insured while an area of risk common to women is
excluded, thus women are only partially insured.
Another manner in which men are protected from risks that women
are not is mentioned in the Court's footnotes. 82 Women who suffer a
non-pregnancy-related disability are not protected if the disability occurs
while they are on leave from work because of pregnancy. Workers absent
for any other reason are covered for disabilities suffered while away. The
Court does not attempt to explain why this does not constitute sex
discrimination. The merit of distinguishing between disabilities suffered
while away from work for vacations, layoffs, or work stoppage, and those
suffered while absent for pregnancy is not apparent.
(b) Uniqueness analysis.-The Court's second ground for denying that
GE's policy was a pretext to discrimination, the uniqueness analysis, is
also vulnerable. The Court begins with the following statement: "[W]e
have here no question of excluding a disease or disability comparable in all
other respects to covered diseases or disabilities and yet confined to the
members of one race or sex." 83 Pregnancy is not "comparable" to covered
diseases or disabilities, Justice Rehnquist explained, because it is not a
disease84 and "is often a voluntarily undertaken and desired condition."
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These were the only arguments offered by the majority in support of its
conclusion that pregnancy is sui generis.
The significance of the fact that pregnancy is not a disease is not
explained-perhaps the Court meant only that pregnancy must be com-
pared to covered disabilities rather than diseases. Justice Brennan pointed
out, however, that "the label 'disease' rather than 'disability' cannot be
. . .determinative," since the plan excluded pregnancies complicated by
diseases86 and diseases unrelated to pregnancy arising during maternity
leave.87 The distinction between pregnancy and covered diseases or
disabilities is thus reduced to the single point of voluntariness.
The Court carefully phrased its reference to the voluntary nature of
pregnancy, saying that it was "often a voluntarily undertaken and desired
condition."'88 This was probably an attempt to answer the criticism of the
voluntariness argument leveled by the lower courts.8 9 In stressing the
voluntariness of the undertaking and desirability of the condition the Court
may have been seeking to distinguish pregnancy from disabilities or
82. Id. at 404-05 n.4; 416 n.4 (dissenting opinion).
83. Id, at 408.
84. Id,
85. Id.
86. Id. at 416 (dissenting opinion).
87. Id.; see note 82 and accompanying text supra.
88. Id. at 408.
89. See notes 37-38 and accompanying text supra.
injuries arising from voluntary activities such as sports, and from condi-
tions workers seek to correct by elective cosmetic surgery.9" The latter
would not be desirable conditions, and while sports injuries result from a
voluntary pursuit, the disability itself is not incurred voluntarily. These
distinctions do not legitimize the voluntariness argument for several
reasons.
91
"[O]ther than for childbirth disability, [GE] has never construed its
plan as eliminating all so-called 'voluntary' disabilities.' '92 Further, recent
statistics may indicate that most pregnancies are not volunarily undertaken
or desired conditions.93 While some women may desire to have children,
probably few desire to be pregnant; a desire for the result is not a desire for
the condition leading to it. As the condition may not be desired, it may also
not be voluntary. The percentage of voluntary pregnancies among working
women is probably significantly lower than among women as a whole.
More fundamentally, the voluntariness of procreation is not apparent when
one considers that it is necessary for the continuation of the species.
Furthermore, a freedom of religion problem may exist in the assertion that
pregnancy is voluntary. It implies that a woman can choose to terminate the
pregnancy,94 whereas many women in good conscience cannot.
Justice Rehnquist attempted to deemphasize the majority's reliance
upon voluntariness, mentioning it only once, 9 but its significance is
apparent. Once the validity of the voluntariness argument is refuted, no
support remains for the Court's view that the question presented was not
90. Justice Brennan referred to the following covered conditions that he felt were
voluntary: "sports injuries, attempted suicides, venereal disease, disabilities incurrred in the
commission of a crime or during a fight, and elective cosmetic surgery." Id. at 416 (dissenting
opinion), quoting Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661, 665 (4th Cir. 1975). See note 4
supra.
91. The voluntariness and desirability of pregnancy is questionable. Contraception
techniques are not necessarily readily available or 100% effective, as is indicated by the
number of abortions that are sought. Statistically, some regions of the country may be
approaching the point at which most pregnancies are not voluntary or desired. See note 93
infra. Further, sexual intercourse is an inherent part of the marital status; its denial can be
grounds for divorce. Jacobs v. Jacobs, 109 N.J. Super. 287, 263 A.2d 155 (1970); Kreyling v.
Kreyling, 20 N.J. Misc. 52, 23 A.2d 300 (1942); Diemer v. Diemer, 8 N.Y. 2d 206, 168 N.E.2d
654, 203 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1960). So the act leading to pregnancy may not be voluntary. In some
states a husband cannot be guilty of raping his wife. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02
(Baldwin 1971); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121 (Purdon 1973). Contraception and abortion
may not be viable alternatives for some women because of religious beliefs. Most fundamen-
tally, however, pregnancy is not optional with women as a group if the human race is to
continue.
There is a significant danger in the Court's reliance on the voluntary aspect of pregnancy.
If a woman could prove that her pregnancy was not voluntary or desired would she then be
entitled to coverage? Justice Brennan recognized that proof of the voluntary nature of a
particular pregnancy may have to be through "obnoxious, intrusive means," and this could
justify an employer's treating all pregnancies as voluntary. Id. at 415 n.3 (dissenting opinion).
Undoubtedly, the question posed would be answered in the negative by the Court; nonethe-
less, it does indicate a weakness in the Court's reliance on the voluntary aspect of pregnancy.
92. Id. at 415-16 (dissenting opinion), quoting Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d
661, 665 (4th Cir. 1975).
93. For District of Columbia residents in 1975, for example, 9,819 abortions were
performed compared to 9,746 live births, indicating that more than half the conceptions were
undesired, i.e., involuntary. RESEARCH STATISTICS Div., OFFICE OF PLANNING AND EVALUA-
TION OF WASHINGTON, D.C., DEP'T OF HUMAN RESEARCH, THERAPEUTIC ABORTION IN Dis-
TRICT OF COLUMBIA (1975).
94. See note 91 supra.
95. 97 S. Ct. at 408.
one of excluding a disability comparable to covered disabilities except that
it is confined to one sex. The Court's second basis for determining that the
plan was not a pretext for discrimination is undercut.
While Justice Brennan would not agree that pregnancy is voluntary,
he was willing to assume so for the sake of argument. 96 Making this
assumption, he nonetheless adamantly asserted that the plan was a pretext
for discrimination. The belief that GE's discriminatory attitude was a
"motivating factor in its policy" led Brennan to this conclusion. 97
[TI he Court simply disregards a history of General Electric
practices that have served to undercut the employment oppor-
tunities of women who become pregnant while employed.
Moreover, the Court studiously ignores the undisturbed conclu-
sion of the District Court that General Electric's "discriminatory
attitude" toward women was a "motivating factor in its policy"
... ,and that the pregnancy exclusion was neither "neutral in
its face" nor "in its intent". ...98
Brennan further supported his finding of discriminatory motivation by
contrasting GE's exclusion of pregnancy to its inclusion of other sex-linked
disabilities, such as prostatectomies, vasectomies and circumcisions.
99
4. Discriminatory Effect.-After noting that in "some" Title VII
cases a prima facie case can be established by showing discriminatory
effect, I0I the majority denied the existence of any such effect. Its rationale
was much the same as in finding no pretext for discrimination. That is,
there was no showing of gender-based effects 1 ' because the risks covered
were the same for men and women. 102 Moreover, "the fiscal and actuarial
benefits of the program . . . accrue to members of both sexes." 0 3 The
Court did give a slightly new twist to the risk analysis by arguing that
"there is no proof that the package is in fact worth more to men than to
women.' '104 This position was supported in a footnoted'015 rationalization
that the insurance represented extra compensation in an amount equal for
men and women, and if the employer were to increase wages in lieu of
paying the insurance premium "there would clearly be no gender-based
discrimination." 106
96. Id. at 415 n.3 (dissenting opinion).
97. Id. at 416 (dissenting opinion), quoting Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp.
371, 383 (E.D. Va. 1974).
98. Id. at 415 (dissenting opinion, footnotes and citations omitted), quoting 375 F.
Supp. at 383. See 97 S. Ct. at 415 n.1 (dissenting opinion). Especially revealing of GE's
discriminatory attitude is the fact that the company abandoned its forced maternity leave
policy only in 1973 "approximately coinciding with the commencement of this suit." Id.
99. Id. at 416 (dissenting opinion), quoting 375 F. Supp. at 383.
100. 97 S. Ct. at 408. Contra, id. at 417 (dissenting opinion).
101. Id. at 409.
102. "[T]he evidence ... tended to illustrate that the selection of risks covered by the
Plan did not operate, in fact, to discriminate against woman." Id. See notes 79-82 and
accompanying text supra.
103. Id. at 409.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 409 n.17.
106. Id. Cost, like voluntariness, was not emphasized by the court. Nonetheless, it is a
strong undertone of the opinion. In stating the background of the case Justice Rehnquist noted
the district court's findings on cost. Id. 404-05, 409 n.9, and 406 n.10.
There are two difficulties with concluding that the insurance is not
worth more to men. First, as any insurance company is quick to point out,
much of the value of insurance is the "peace of mind" it brings. Under the
GE plan, male employees can feel confident that they and their families
will be protected regardless of the disability that might prevent them from
working. Female employees and their families have no assurance of
continued income in the face of one of the most common of disabilities.
Thus the plan is worth more to the male. Second, while it may be true that
both men and women would receive the same compensation if the cost of
insurance were paid as wages, this manipulation is deceptive. Temporary
disability insurance is but one of many fringe benefits commonly provided
by employers. If the value of all fringes is translated into direct compensa-
tion, parity may not be maintained. For instance, if in addition to
temporary disability insurance the employer provides life insurance, its
contribution may be higher for male than for female employees not only
because premiums may be higher, 10 7 but because the value of insurance is
often porportional to the individual's salary. 0 8 The face value of the
insurance, and therefore the premium, would be higher since men currently
receive approximately seventy-five percent higher wages than women.109
Justice Brennan approached the effect question differently:
General Electric's disability program has three divisible sets
of effects. First, the plan covers all disabilities that mutually
afflict both sexes. . . .Second, the plan insures against all
disabilities that are male-specific or have a predominant impact
on males. Finally, all female-specific and-impacted disabilities
are covered, except for the most prevalent, pregnancy.I"
Examination of the last two effects illustrates the adverse impact of GE's
disability program on women. Thus, even if the Court is unwilling to
attribute discriminatory motives to GE's plan,' 1 ' discriminatory effect is
clearly demonstrated.
The treatment given cost in a case involving a plan similar to GE's, Brooklyn Union Gas
Co. v. New York State Rights, 41 N.Y.2d 84, 359 N.E.2d 393, 390 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1976), is
sensible:
[W]e set aside the spectres of assertedly prohibitive cost predicted to accompany
any provision of equal benefits for pregnancy-related disability. A court cannot
responsibly be wholly indifferent to the economic impact likely to attend its
decisions, but neither can the prospect of financial impact dictate the judicial
outcome. We do not doubt that the eradication of sexual discrimination . . . will
normally be expensive at least in the short run.
Id. at -, 359 N.E.2d at 398, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 889.
107. Insurance companies are permitted to "set back" a woman's age in determining
premiums, i.e., to pay the same premium as a man three years younger. PA. INS. DEP'T, INS.
COMM'R'S ADVISORY TASK FORCE ON WOMEN'S INSURANCE PROBLEMS, FINAL REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 25 (1974).
108. See, e.g., 4 Pa. Code § 27.133, which provides that employees of the state of
Pennsylvania are insured in an "amount. . .approximately equal to the employe's annual
rate of pay .... "
109. U.S. EMPL. STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, WOMEN'S BUREAU, DEP'T. OF LABOR,
THE EARNINGS GAP BETWEEN WOMEN AND MEN 2 (1976).
110. 97 S. Ct. at 417-18 (dissenting opinion).
11. See notes 97-99 and accompanying text supra.
5. Applicability of the EEOC Guideline. 1 12-Justice Brennan re-
cognized that,
however one defines the profile of risks protected by General
Electric, the determinative question must be whether the social
policies and aims to be furthered by Title VII and filtered through
the phrase "to discriminate" contained in § 703(a)(1) fairly
forbid an ultimate pattern of coverage that insures all risks
except a commonplace one that is applicable to women but not to
men. 
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He then declared that "this is a paradigm example of the type of complex
economic and social inquiry that Congress wisely left to resolution by the
EEOC pursuant to its Title VII mandate. 1 1 4 The majority, however,
deemed the EEOC's resolution of the matter to be unacceptable.
The Court first observed that Congress had not empowered the EEOC
with rule-making authority and that the guideline it promulgated therefore
lacked the force of law. 115 Rather, the weight to be accorded this guideline
depended on its conformity to four standards: (1) "the thoroughness
evident in its consideration"; (2) "the validity of its reasoning"; (3) "its
consistency" with other pronouncements; and (4) "all those factors which
give it power to persuade."" ' 6 The Court concluded that the EEOC
guideline "does not receive high marks when judged by [these] standards
.... 17 It was not contemporaneous with the enactment of Title VII, t
it "flatly contradicts" earlier pronouncements by the EEOC, 119 and it
conflicts with the Title VII provision that prevents certain sex-based
"differentiations" authorized by the Equal Pay Act 2 ' from being unlawful
employment practices. '21
Justice Brennan rejected this treatment of the EEOC guideline. He
suggested that the delay between enactment of Title VII and promulgation
of the guideline resulted from the extensive investigation necessary to
formulate policy in this complex area. 122 This indicates "thoroughness" in
the guideline's consideration and supports the "validity of its reasoning."
112. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10, quoted at note 33 supra.
113. 97 S. Ct. at 418 (dissenting opinion).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 410-11.
116. Id. at 411, quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
117. Id. at 411.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1971). Subparagraph (1) provides:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall
discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed,
between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such
establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the
opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of
which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed
under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to
(i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by
quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor
other than sex.
121. 97 S. Ct. at 412.
122. Id. at 418 (dissenting opinion).
Furthermore, Brennan denied that the guideline was in conflict with earlier
pronouncements of the EEOC. The allegedly inconsistent pronouncements
were opinions of EEOC General Counsel given while the issue was still
being studied. These opinions represented an "unwillingness to impose
additional, potentially premature costs on employers during the decision-
making stages .... "123 Brennan termed it a "bitter irony that the care
that preceeded promulgation of the 1972 guideline is . . . condemned
. . . as tardy indecisiveness . . 124
In their dissenting opinions neither Justice Brennan nor Justice
Stevens addressed the conflict between sections 703(a) 125 and 703(h) of
Title VII, 126 the latter of which defers to the Equal Pay Act. 127 More
precisely stated, the conflict is between the EEOC guideline and a
regulation of the Wage and Hour Administrator promulgated pursuant to
section 206(d) of the Equal Pay Act. 2 8 The latter specifies that either an
employer's contribution for insurance benefits or the employees' benefits
received can be equal without violation of the Equal Pay Act; that is,
benefits received by female employees can be different from those of male
employees if the employer's contribution for both is the same. 129 In
contrast the EEOC guideline provides that if disability insurance is
provided it must include coverage for pregnancy' 3°--employer contribu-
tion is not a factor. The Court translated this distinction into a conflict
between the EEOC guideline and Title VII by pointing out that section
703(h) of Title VII provides that differentiations authorized by section
206(d) of the Equal Pay Act would not be unlawful employment practices
under Title VII. 131 Thus the Court reasoned that since GE's pregnancy
exclusion was authorized by the Wage and Hour Administrator's regula-
tions it was authorized under Section 703(h) and did not violate Title
VII. 132
123. Id. at 419 (dissenting opinion).
124. Id.
125. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1971).
126. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1971).
127. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1971), quoted at note 120 supra. Justice Brennan did point out
that after adoption of the EEOC guideline similar pregnancy-inclusive rules were approved by
Congress and the President under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C.
(Supp. II § 1681(a)); see 45 C.F.R. § 86.57(c)," and that federal Civil Service employees are
"eligible for maternity and pregnancy coverage under their sick leave program." Further,
prior to the EEOC guideline "Congress enacted.., a pregnancy-inclusive rule to govern the
distribution of benefits for 'sickness' under the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, 45
U.S.C. § 351(k)(2)." 97 S Ct. at 419.
128. 29 C.F.R. § 800.116(d)(1975) states:
If employer contributions to-a plan providing insurance or similar benefits to
employees are equal for both men and women, no wage differential prohibited by
the equal pay provisions will result from such payments, even though the benefits
which accrue to the employees in question are greater for one sex than for the other.
The mere fact that the employer may make unequal contributions foremployees of
opposite sexes in such a situation will not, however, be considered to indicate that
the employer's payments are in violation of section 6(d), if the resulting benefits are
equal for such employees.
129. Id.
130. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1975), quoted at note 33 supra.
131. 97 S. Ct. at 412.
132. Id.
Although this argument of the majority was not refuted by the
dissenters, it does create difficulties. It subjects the EEOC to the control of
the Wage and Hour Administrator. While Title VII does defer to one
section of the Equal Pay Act, there is no indication that Congress intended
the EEOC to be subservient to the Wage and Hour Administrator. The
language of section 206(d)'33 is not broad, and the Court failed to question
the validity of the Wage and Hour Administrator's regulations. Rehnquist
merely saw the conflict between the guideline and the regulation and
resolved it in favor of the latter.' 34 He ignored the opportunity for
discrimination contained in the Wage and Hour Administrator's regula-
tion: for different insurance or benefit policies an employer could choose a
different method of complying with the regulation, providing equal be-
nefits in programs for which male coverage was more costly, but providing
equal contribution in programs for which female coverage was more
costly. While the Court correctly noted the conflict, its resolution is not
satisfactory.
B. Limitations of the Gilbert Decision
The potential impact of this decision is so broad'3 5 that every attempt
should be made to limit it. Employers will undoubtedly argue in diverse
circumstances that Gilbert precludes the possibility of pregnancy being a
basis of sex discrimination.' 36 This interpretation goes too far. The
traditional principle that cases must be limited to their facts should be urged
forcefully in response.
The plan at issue in Gilbert was a "Weekly Sickness and Accident
Insurance Plan,"1 37 a temporary disability insurance plan. The majority
was careful to qualify its finding of nondiscrimination in GE's pregnancy
exclusion by the words "under a disability benefits plan." Virtually every
time the Court's conclusion is stated it is accompanied by these qualifying
words. '3 8 Thus Gilbert may not be controlling with regard to sick leave
programs or other employee incentives. At least one recent action of the
Court hints that this is so. Subsequent to Gilbert, certiorari was granted in
Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 3 9 in which an employer's policy of excluding
normal pregnancy from a sick leave program had been struck down by the
Sixth Circuit as a violation of Title VII. This reveals the Court's feeling that
an important question of law remains in the issue of pregnancy and sick
133. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1971), quoted at note 120 supra.
134. 97 S. Ct. at 412.
135. See note 59 supra; Ginsburg & Roth, Pregnancy and Discrimination, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 25, 1977, at 35, col. 2.
136. See Anderson v. Upper Bucks County Area Vo-Tech School, Doc. No. 727 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. filed Apr. 22, 1976), Supplemental Brief of Appellant at 7, 9; Brief of Amicus
Curiae, Westinghouse Elec. Corp., in Support of Appellant at 13.
137. 97 S. Ct. at 404.
138. E.g., id. at 407, 408, 409.
139. 522 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 806 (1977). The court denied
certiorari, however, in another such Title V11 case. Hutchinson v. Lake Oswego School Dist.,
519 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 731 (1977).
leave. The granting of certiorari in Satty can be contrasted with the Court's
vacating and remanding, "for further consideration in light of General
Electric v. Gilbert," the judgment in Communication Workers of Ameri-
ca v. AT&T, 140 which held that a disability plan similar to GE's violated
Title VII. The latter was undoubtedly vacated on the ground that Gilbert
was determinative of the issue. Conversely, the grant of review in Satty
suggests that Gilbert is not determinative of whether pregnancy exclusions
from sick leave policies violate Title VII.
The Gilbert opinion is also limited by the Court's reliance on the
"underinclusiveness of the risk" argument. 14 This analysis is peculiar to
"an insurance package."1 42 There are also several references to "fiscal
and actuarial benefits of the program"' 143 in the opinion and, by the
dissenters, to the majority's utilization of "sex-neutral selection of
risks." 1" Since these considerations are peculiar to insurance or similar
risk-predictive programs, they limit the holding.
New attempts should be made to preclude application of Gilbert to
areas such as maternity leave, hiring and firing policies, and use of sick
leave. The possibility of application in these areas, as well as the need to
circumvent the decision's impact on temporary disability insurance pro-
grams, necessitates a search for alternative sources of protection.
IV. Alternatives to Title VII Protection
A. Possibility of Federal Alternatives
Since the Court determined that the exclusion of pregnancy from a
disability benefits plan is not a sex-based classification but rather a
disability-based classification, passage of the Equal Rights Amendment
45
would have little practical effect on the Gilbert decision. 14 While sex
discrimination would probably be evaluated under standards parallel to
those used in fourteenth amendment race discrimination cases, pregnancy
would first have to be established as a sex-based classification. Gilbert
forecloses this opportunity, at least for temporary disability insurance
programs. Furthermore, the fourteenth amendment prohibits, as by analo-
gy would the equal rights amendment, only invidious discrimination;
14 7
Title VII prohibits all discrimination. 14 8 Thus the ERA probably would
afford less protection for women in this aspect of the employment sphere
than does Title VII.
140. 513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 97 S. Ct. 724 (1977).
141. See notes 79-82 and accompanying text supra.
142. 97 S. Ct. at 409.
143. Id. See also id. at 406 n.10.
144. Id. at 416 (dissenting opinion). See also id. at 414 (dissenting opinion).
145. H.R.J. Res. 208, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S.J. Res. 8, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971).
146. It may, however, have a psychological effect, and would help avoid the problems
women's rights groups see arising from the Court's reliance on fourteenth amendment cases
for interpreting Title VII. See note 59 supra.
147. Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661,667 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 401
(1976).
148. Id.
Federal legislation seems to be the only answer on the national front.
The necessary action could easily be accomplished by an amendment to
Title VII that would make pregnancy one of the forbidden bases of
discrimination.' 4 9 Recently, such legislation has been proposed. 5 0 Al-
though the amendment to Title VII is brief, if enacted it would prohibit
employment discrimination based on pregnancy. The Supreme Court's
restrictive reading of the present act has made this or a similar amendment
necessary if the act is to continue to aid in equalizing employment
opportunities.
B. Available State Alternatives
I. The Question of Preemption. -Without further legislative action
at the federal or state levels, protection against plans such as GE's is still
possible under state law. Most states have legislation that prohibits sex
discrimination in employment. 5 ' These states are not bound to follow the
Court's interpretation of federal statutes when construing their own similar
statutes.' 52 Nevertheless, the possibility of federal preemption of state law
should be considered.1
53
The Civil Rights Act of 1964'14 makes clear that Congress did not
intend to preclude state efforts to alleviate discrimination. Section 1104 of
the Act' 5 provides as follows:
Nothing contained in any title of this Act shall be construed as
indicating an intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field in
which any such title operates to the exclusion of State laws on
the same subject matter, nor shall any provision of this Act be
construed as invalidating any provision of State law unless such
provision is inconsistent with any of the purposes of this Act, or
any provisions thereof.
A specific disclaimer of federal preemption is expressed in Title VII as
149. Women's groups and public interest groups in Washington, D.C., have organized.
the Campaign to End Discrimination Against Pregnant Workers to work towards passage of
legislation in this area. Conversation of Feb. 23, 1977, with Women's Legal Defense Fund,
Wash., D.C., a participant in the Campaign.
150. S.B. 995, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977), amending 42 U.S.C. § 200e (definition
section of Title VII) as follows:
(k) The terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include, but are not
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including
receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected
but similar in their ability or inability to work, and nothing in section 703(h) of this
title shall be interpreted to permit otherwise.
For similar state statutes, see note 163 infra.
151. See notes 162-64 and accompanying text infra.
152. Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. New York State Rights, 41 N.Y.2d 84,359N.E.2d 393,
390 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1976). See notes 168-72 and accompanying text infra. Even before the
Supreme Court decided Gilbert a New York court recognized that a decision by the Supreme
Court would not affect interpretation of state law:
In any event, were the Supreme Court to declare that exclusion of pregnancy
and maternity benefits was to no extent based on sex, we would not be obliged to
accept such determination for the purposes of our State's Human Rights Law.
Union Free School Dist. No. 6 v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 35 N.Y.2d 371,
377 n.l, 320 N.E.2d 859, 861 n.1, 362 N.Y.S.2d 139, 142 n.1 (1974).
153. The issue was raised in Anderson v. Upper Bucks Co. Area Vo-Tec School, No.
76-727 (Pa. Commw. Ct. filed April 22, 1976), Supplemental Brief for Appellee at 4-7.
154. Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241,28 U.S.C. § 1447 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-1975d,
2000a-2000h-6 (1971).
155. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, Title XI, § 1104, 78 Stat. 268, 42 U.S.C. §
2000h-4(1971).
well. 156 It recognizes the validity of "any present or future law of any
State" that is not contrary to the Equal Employment Opportunities Sub-
chapter (Title VII).
While Congress has manifested an intent not to foreclose state
prohibition of employment discrimination, this does not necessarily end
the preemption issue. The question remains whether state courts' statutory
interpretations differing from the Supreme Court's interpretation of Title
VII are inconsistent or contrary to federal law. A traditional test for
determining whether state law is inconsistent with federal law is whether it
is "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress." 157 In cases affecting interstate commerce, as
do Title VII cases, the degree of burden on interstate commerce is also
examined. 158
The Gilbert decision notwithstanding, the purpose of Title VII, inter
alia, is "to assure equality of employment opportunities by eliminating
those practices and devices that discriminate on the basis of . . .sex
.... ,,159 A state statutory interpretation that prohibits exclusion of
pregnancy from coverage under disability benefit plans does nothing to
interfere with this purpose. 16° Nor would differing state standards of
employment practices regarding pregnancy demand uniformity. To avoid
violating any state's laws, a multi-state employer could merely comply
with the strictest state standard, or could provide differing policies for
employees in each state. 161 National uniformity is not demanded; states
may mandate that employers providing temporary disability insurance
must include coverage for pregnancy.
2. Types of State Statutes.-The Gilbert decision necessitates
turning to state law as a basis for requiring employer-sponsored disability
plans to cover pregnancy. The strength of the basis thus provided varies
with the state statute. States can be classified into three groups based on the
existence and type of employment antidiscrimination legislation: states
with no protective legislation; 162 states with statutes specifically prohibit-
156, Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, Title VII, § 708, 78 Stat. 262, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-7.
157. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1940).
158. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 135 (1963); Colorado
Anti-Discrimination Commission v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 372 U.S. 714, 718 (1963).
159. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974). See also McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
429-30 (1971).
160. Courts are reluctant to find a conflict between state and federal law in areas in which
Congress has not clearly indicated an intent for federal action to be exclusive. Usually only
when the regulated party cannot conform to both standards concurrently is there found to be a
conflict. See Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973); Florida
Lime & Avocado Growers Ass'n. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963); Associated General Contrac-
tors of Mass., Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9(lst Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957(1974).
161. Associated General Contractors of Mass., Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9, 15(1st Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974); New York State Division of Human Rights v. New
York-Pennsylvania Professional Basketball League, 36 App. Div. 2d 364, -, 320 N.Y.S.2d
788, 795 (1971), affl'd, 29 N.Y.2d 921, 279 N.E.2d 856, 329 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1972).
162. E.g., Ala., Ark., Ga., La., Miss., N.C., N.D., Tenn., Tex., and Va., 3 EMPL. PRAC.
GUIDE (CCH) 20,101;20,723; 21,912; 23,548;24,701;26,448;26,523;27,898;28,048;29,398
respectively (1976).
ting discrimination based on pregnancy;' 63 and states having general
antidiscrimination statutes. 164
In the several states without protective legislation there is no readily
available alternative-the Gilbert ruling denies female employees relief
from the pregnancy exclusion in disability plans and subjects them to
whatever further exclusionary practices lower courts may justify by
analogy to Gilbert. On the other hand, the Gilbert decision should not have
any impact in states that specifically prohibit pregnancy-based dis-
crimination-the statutes of these states simply attack discrimination more
vigorously than does Title VII.
163. In Alaska it is unlawful for
an employer to refuse employment to a person, or to bar him from employment, or
to discriminate against him in compensation or in a term, condition, or privilege of
employment because of his race, religion, color or national origin, or because of his
age, physical handicap, sex, marital status, changes in marital status, pregnancy or
parenthood when the reasonable demands of the position do not require distinction
on the basis of age, physical handicap, sex, marital status, changes in marital status,
pregnancy or parenthood.
ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(1) (Supp. 1976).
In Connecticut it is an unfair employment practice
(i) to terminate a woman's employment because of her pregnancy or (ii) to
refuse to grant to said employee a reasonable leave of absence for disability
resulting from such pregnancy or (iii) to deny to said employee who is disabled as a
result of pregnancy, any compensation to which she is entitled as a result of the
accumulation of disability or leave benefits accrued pursuant to plans maintained
by said employer.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-126 (West Supp. 1977).
Montana law prohibits an employer from terminating employment or refusing leave
because of pregnancy, requiring mandatory maternity leave for an unreasonable length of
time, or denying "any compensation to which she (the employee) is entitled as a result of the
accumulation of disability or leave benefits accrued pursuant to plans maintained by her
employer." MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 41-2602 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
These statutes prohibit discrimination in the administration of leave and in the denial of
some benefits, such as sick pay. The Alaska statute also prohibits exclusion of pregnancy
from disability insurance, as constituting pregnancy-based discrimination in a term or
privilege of employment. But the applicability of the Connecticut and Montana statutes to
prohibit pregnancy exclusions in disability insurance policies is questionable. These statutes
require payment of benefits to which an employee is entitled as a result of leave benefit plans;
arguably, coverage for pregnancy-related disability is not a benefit to which an employee is
entitled if the plan explicitly excludes pregnancy coverage. Nevertheless, the legislative
intent behind this legislation supports the prohibition of all discrimination based on
pregnancy.
164. E.g., Fair Employment Practices Act, DEL. CODE tit. 19 § 711(a) (1974); Fair
Employment Practices Act, Mo. ANN. CODE art. 49B § 19 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Fair Employ-
ment Practice Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4 (West Supp. 1976); Law Against
Discrimination, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-3 (1976); Human Rights Law, N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296
(McKinney Supp. 1976); Fair Employment Practice Law, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02
(Baldwin 1971); Human Relations Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955 (Purdon Supp. 1976).
A few of these states, e.g., Del., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 71 1(h) (1974); Md., MD. ANN.
CODE art. 49B, § 19(g)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1976); Pa., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955(a)(3) (Purdon
Supp. 1976), have carved insurance exceptions into their statutes. These are typified by the
Maryland provision: "[I]t is not unlawful for an employer ... to observe the term of any
bona fide employee benefit plan such as. . . [an] insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge to
evade the purposes of the subtitle .. "If, as it appears, disability insurance programs fall
within these exceptions, policies excluding pregnancy coverage would be permissible under
state law.
Many of the states with general antidiscrimination laws have implemented their statutes
through regulations or guidelines. E.g., Md., 3 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 23,820 (1976);
Mass., 3 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 24,055; N.Y., 3 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 26,059A
(1976); Pa., 16 Pa. Code 41.101-.104, 5 Pa. Bull. 1299 (May 17, 1975), 3 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE
(CCH) 27,270 (1976). These interpret the statutes as prohibiting pregnancy-based discrimi-
nation in leave and benefit policies, including disability insurance coverage.
A few states, e.g., Md. and Pa., have both the insurance exception and regulations
covering disability insurance. The conflict between the two is apparent.
Gilbert will have its greatest impact in states whose antidiscrimina-
tion provisions are similar to those of Title VII. Unfortunately, the majority
of the states fall into this category. While courts in these states are not
bound to follow the Gilbert interpretation, the similarity of their statutes'
65
to Title VII may make it difficult to justify a different construction.
Predictably, the ironical situation may now occur in which defendant
employers rather than plaintiff employees' 66 will urge adoption of Title VII
analysis.
3. Distinguishing Gilbert.-Several factors may aid in distinguish-
ing state and federal legislation and thus preventing the weakening of Title
VII from leading to the demise of state antidiscrimination statutes. A state
may have regulations or guidelines forbidding pregnancy-based discrimi-
nation that are entitled to greater weight than was the EEOC guideline. 1
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In addition, the state's regulations or guidelines may be uncontradicted by
other state regulations, in contrast to the EEOC guideline's clash with the
Wage and Hour Administrator's regulations. The legislative history of the
state statute may be more positive than that of Title VII. 168 Moreover, prior
to Gilbert, state courts may have interpreted their statutes to prohibit
pregnancy-based discrimination. The experience in Pennsylvania and New
York is illustrative of these distinctions.
The Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (PHRC) has
adopted regulations on "Employment Policies Relating to Pregnancy,
Childbirth, and Childrearing.'" 169 These regulations prohibit pregnancy-
165. The similarity is more significant than a mere coincidence of verbiage-it indicates
federal leadership in the civil rights field. This leadership is further illustrated by other
relationships. Most state statutes and amendments prohibiting sex discrimination were
passed after passage of the federal statute in 1964. States that have not followed the precise
wording of the federal statute have adopted the same general concept. Most states that have
issued regulations or guidelines did so after the promulgation of the EEOC guidelines and
adopted substantially the same language.
Another indication of the pervasive federal dominance in the sex discrimination area is
the adoption by some state courts of the analysis, and the burden of proof requirements, set
by federal courts in deciding pregnancy-related Title VII claims. See Cedar Rapids Communi-
ty School Dist. v. Parr, - Iowa -, 227 N.W.2d 486 (1975). There is also a general similarity in
state and federal courts' interpretations of the applicability of antidiscrimination laws to
pregnancy issues.
166. Anderson v. Upper Bucks County Area Vo-Tec School, No. 76-727 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. filed Apr. 22, 1976). Brief of Amicus Curiae, Westinghouse Elec. Corp., in Support of
Appellant 28 states: "Before the Gilbert decision the PHRC (Pa. Human Relations Comm'n)
urged in Appellee's Brief at 7-8 that this Court should follow the case precedent under Title
VI. Now that the cases under Title VII hold that excluding pregnancy is not sex discrimina-
tion, the PHRA will no doubt urge that those decisions are irrelevant."
167. See notes 115-20 and accompanying text supra for discussion of weight given the
EEOC guideline. In contrast regulations or guidelines of state agencies may have more
influence on state courts. For instance, in Pennsylvania, regulations promulgated by state
agencies pursuant to statutory authority have the force of law.PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 45, § 1501
(Supp. 1975). Thus, although the legislature has not passed a law, the Pennsylvania Human
Relations Commission's adoption of rules and regulations prohibiting pregnancy-related
discrimination has the same effect as legislative action. But see note 164 supra (discussion of
Pennsylvania law and regulation).
168. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S. Ct. 401, 412 (1976); Anderson v. Upper
Bucks County Vo-Tec School, No. 76-727 (Pa. Commw. Ct. filed Apr. 22, 1976), Supplemen-
tal Brief for Appellee at 14-18.
169. 16 Pa. Code § 41.101-104, 5 Pa. Bull. 12-9 (May 17, 1975), 3 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDe
(CCH) 27,270 (1976). Section 41.103(a) provides:
based discrimination in disability benefit plans, including temporary
disability insurance programs. 70 They were specifically authorized by the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA)171 and have the force of
law. 172 This is in contrast to the EEOC guideline, which can at most be
given great deference and whose weight is ultimately determined by the
reviewing court. 173 The Pennsylvania regulations do not conflict with
earlier pronouncements by the PHRC, nor do they conflict with other state
agency regulations. 174
The Pennsylvania legislature's intent in amending the PHRA to
include sex discrimination is expressed in the Act itself:
(a) . . . The denial of equal employment. . . and the conse-
quent failure to utilize the productive capacities of individuals to
their fullest extent, deprives large segments of the population of
the Commonwealth of earnings necessary to maintain decent
standards of living, necessitates their resort to public relief and
intensifies group conflicts ....
(b) It is hereby declared to be the public policy of this Com-
monwealth to foster the employment of all individuals in accord-
ance with their fullest capacities regardless of their. . . sex...
and to safeguard their right to obtain and hold employment
without . . . discrimination . . . ."
This language stands in sharp contrast to that spoken by the United States
Congress when it amended Title VII to include sex. 176 Further, the PHRA
calls for liberal construction of the Act: "The provisions of this Act shall be
construed liberally for the accomplishment of the purposes thereof, and
any law inconsistent with any provisions hereof shall not apply."' 77 This
liberal construction mandate is especially important. It gives a Pennsyl-
vania court added authority to provide the Act with a construction different
from that given Title VII by the United States Supreme Court.
The Pennsylvania courts have construed the PHRA as prohibiting
pregnancy-based discrimination. While the temporary disability insurance
issue has not been addressed directly, the courts have consistently required
that pregnancy be treated as any other disability.
(a) Temporary disability due to pregnanty or childbirth.
Written and unwritten employment practices and policies regarding job be-
nefits and job security, including, but not limited to, commencement and duration
of leave, the availability of extensions, the accrual of seniority and other benefits
and privileges, reinstatement and payment under any health or temporary disability
insurance or sick leave plan, formal or informal, shall be applied to disability due to
pregnancy or childbirth on the same terms and conditions as they are applied to
other temporary disabilities.
170. Id.
171. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 957(d) (Purdon 1964).
172. See note 167 supra.
173. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S. Ct. 401, 410-12 (1976). See notes 115-20 and
accompanying text supra.
174. They are harmonious with Insurance Department regulations that require health
insurance plans to cover pregnancy complications. See Anderson v. Upper Bucks County
Vo-Tec School, No. 76-727 (Pa. Commw. Ct. filed Apr. 22, 1976), Supplemental Brief for
Appellee at 19.
175. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 952 (Purdon Supp. 1976).
176. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S. Ct. 401, 412 (1976); Anderson v. Upper
Bucks County Vo-Tec School, Dec. No. 727 (Pa. Commw. Ct. filed Apr. 22, 1976),
Supplemental Brief for Appellee at 14-18.
177. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 962 (Purdon 1964).
In Cerra v. East Stroudsburg Area School District1 78 the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court examined the validity of a school district's policy that
required a pregnant teacher to resign before the sixth month of pregnancy.
When the plaintiff refused to resign, the school board terminated her
contract. The court had "no hesitancy in reaching the conclusion that the
Board's action was violative of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act
. ... ,and, therefore, was illegal.' ' 179 The court's rationale was simple
but precise:
Mrs. Cerra's contract was terminated absolutely, solely
because of pregnancy. . . . Male teachers, who might well be
temporarily disabled from a multitude of illnesses, have not and
will not be so harshly treated. In short, Mrs. Cerra and other
pregnant women are singled out and placed in a class to their
disadvantage. They are discharged from their employment on
the basis of a physical condition peculiar to their sex. This is sex
discrimination pure and simple.
The court found no bona fide occupational qualification or unique,
burdensome administrative problem that would justify such a policy.'
8'
Additionally, in a brief reference, the court recognized that the school
district's policy infringed upon a woman's fundamental right to
procreate. 182
Two Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court decisions' 83 have inter-
preted Cerra to mean that "pregnancy is a physical disability, though
naturally limited to the female sex, which may not be treated differently
from other long-term physical disabilities suffered by all employees."1 84
In a third decision, Unemployment Compensation Board of Review v.
Perry,185 the same court has held that for unemployment compensation
purposes "pregnancy [must] be treated as any other disease."' 8 6 This
language is broad and seems to grant protection in all areas of employment
discrimination based on pregnancy.
The commonwealth court is presently considering another pregnancy
discrimination case, Anderson v. Upper Bucks County Area Vocational
Technical School, s7 in which the issue whether denial of the benefit of
accumulated sick leave for pregnancy-related work absence violates the
PHRA has been raised. There is no reason to suspect that the court will
178. 450 Pa. 207, 299 A.2d 277 (1973). For more thorough discussion of this case, see 77
DICK L. REV. 685 (1973).
179. 450 Pa. at 212, 299 A.2d at 279.
180. Id. at 213, 299 A.2d at 280.
181. Id. at 214, 299 A.2d at 280.
182. "Moreover, efficiency is not the only value to be considered." Id., citing Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
183. Leechburg Area School Dist. v. Commonwealth Human Relations Comm'n., 19 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 614, 339 A.2d 850 (1975); Freeport Area School Dist. v. Commonwealth Human
Relations Comm'n., 18 Pa. Commw. Ct. 400, 335 A.2d 873 (1975).
184. Leechburg Area School Dist. v. Commonwealth Human Relations Comm'n., 19 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 614, 619, 339 A.2d 850, 853 (1975).
185. 22 Pa. Commw. Ct. 429, 349 A.2d 531 (1975).
186. Id. at 432, 349 A.2d at 533.
187. No. 76-727 (Pa. Commw. Ct. filed Apr. 22, 1976).
change its position on the pregnancy issue. Nothing in the Act, its
legislative intent, or the regulations promulgated pursuant to it have
changed since the commonwealth court last ruled that pregnancy was a
temporary disability for employment purposes.
The New York situation is parallel to that of Pennsylvania. New
York's Human Rights Law' 88 is similar to Title VII. Guidelines promul-
gated under the authority of the Law prohibit pregnancy-related discrimi-
nation.189 Less than two weeks after the Supreme Court decided Gilbert,
the New York State Court of Appeals held in Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v.
New York State Human Rights Appeal Board'90 that Gilbert is not to be
determinative in its interpretation of the New York law. This reaffirmed
previous holdings 19 1 that employment policies that treat pregnancy and
childbirth differently than other physical or mental impairments or dis-
abilities are prohibited by the Human Rights Law.' 92 Rather than limiting
protection for pregnant workers, the New York court has expanded it. This
was the first New York case to apply such a rule to employment in the
private sector. 193 That this expansion was made despite an alleged conflict
with another statute194 indicates the strength of the court's commitment to
equality for pregnant workers. The court reached its conclusion with full
knowledge of Gilbert, declaring that the "determination of the Supreme
Court, while instructive, is not binding on our court. . . . "' Even the
dissent in Brooklyn Union Gas recognized that Gilbert was not "deter-
minative or even influential." 196
Perhaps the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court will follow this
rationale in deciding Anderson. Other states that have found restrictive
pregnancy policies violative of state antidiscrimination laws 197 may con-
tinue to recognize that the Supreme Court did nothing to change state law.
V. Conclusion
It is disappointing that protection for pregnant workers has not been
afforded in interpreting federal legislation, but it is encouraging that state
statutes, as interpreted, have filled the void and can continue to do
so. General Electric Co. v. Gilbert contains profound social implications.
It represents the Supreme Court's view that society, as reflected in
Congress' failure to protect pregnancy, is not ready to lessen the burden
188. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
189. 3 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 26,059 (1976).
190. 41 N.Y.2d 84, 359 N.E.2d 393, 390 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1976).
191. Id. at - 359 N.E.2d at 395, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 886.
192. Id. at -, 359 N.E.2d at 398, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 889.
193. Id. at -, 359 N.E.2d at 395, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 886.
194. Id. at -, 359 N.E.2d at 395, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 887.
195. Id. at - n.], 359 N.E.2d at 395 n.1, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 886 n.l.
196. Id. at -, 359 N.E.2d at 398, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 890 (dissenting opinion).
197. E.g., Cedar Rapids Community School Dist. v. Parr, - Iowa -, 227 N.W.2d 486
(1975); School Dist. No. 1. Multnomah v. Nilsen, 17 Ore. App. 601, 523 P.2d 1041 (1974),
modified, 271 Ore. 461, 534 P.2d 1135 (1975).
that continuing the species naturally imposes upon females. 198 Nine male
Justices have failed to affirm that society is ready for the full participation
of women in the work force by protecting that participation from disruption
by the necessary function of procreation. In short the Court is telling
women that the problems of balancing motherhood and employment are
the individual's. The Supreme Court must be shown through the passage of
legislation that its interpretation of society's values and Congress' action
was wrong.
KATHLEEN F. MCGRATH
198. The Supreme Court majority's attitude can be seen in General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert,
97 S. Ct. 401, 410 n.17, which states:
The District Court was wrong in assuming, as it did, 375 F. Supp. at 383, that Title
VII's ban on employment discrimination necessarily means that "greater economic
benefit(s)" must be required to be paid to one sex or the other because of their
differing roles in "the scheme of human existence."
